auth/vendor/github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/jwt/jwt.go

562 lines
17 KiB
Go

//go:generate ./gen.sh
// Package jwt implements JSON Web Tokens as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519
package jwt
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/backoff/v2"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/internal/json"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/jwe"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/jwa"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/jwk"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/jws"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
const _jwt = `jwt`
// Settings controls global settings that are specific to JWTs.
func Settings(options ...GlobalOption) {
var flattenAudienceBool bool
//nolint:forcetypeassert
for _, option := range options {
switch option.Ident() {
case identFlattenAudience{}:
flattenAudienceBool = option.Value().(bool)
}
}
v := atomic.LoadUint32(&json.FlattenAudience)
if (v == 1) != flattenAudienceBool {
var newVal uint32
if flattenAudienceBool {
newVal = 1
}
atomic.CompareAndSwapUint32(&json.FlattenAudience, v, newVal)
}
}
var registry = json.NewRegistry()
// ParseString calls Parse against a string
func ParseString(s string, options ...ParseOption) (Token, error) {
return parseBytes([]byte(s), options...)
}
// Parse parses the JWT token payload and creates a new `jwt.Token` object.
// The token must be encoded in either JSON format or compact format.
//
// This function can work with encrypted and/or signed tokens. Any combination
// of JWS and JWE may be applied to the token, but this function will only
// attempt to verify/decrypt up to 2 levels (i.e. JWS only, JWE only, JWS then
// JWE, or JWE then JWS)
//
// If the token is signed and you want to verify the payload matches the signature,
// you must pass the jwt.WithVerify(alg, key) or jwt.WithKeySet(jwk.Set) option.
// If you do not specify these parameters, no verification will be performed.
//
// During verification, if the JWS headers specify a key ID (`kid`), the
// key used for verification must match the specified ID. If you are somehow
// using a key without a `kid` (which is highly unlikely if you are working
// with a JWT from a well know provider), you can workaround this by modifying
// the `jwk.Key` and setting the `kid` header.
//
// If you also want to assert the validity of the JWT itself (i.e. expiration
// and such), use the `Validate()` function on the returned token, or pass the
// `WithValidate(true)` option. Validate options can also be passed to
// `Parse`
//
// This function takes both ParseOption and ValidateOption types:
// ParseOptions control the parsing behavior, and ValidateOptions are
// passed to `Validate()` when `jwt.WithValidate` is specified.
func Parse(s []byte, options ...ParseOption) (Token, error) {
return parseBytes(s, options...)
}
// ParseReader calls Parse against an io.Reader
func ParseReader(src io.Reader, options ...ParseOption) (Token, error) {
// We're going to need the raw bytes regardless. Read it.
data, err := ioutil.ReadAll(src)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, `failed to read from token data source`)
}
return parseBytes(data, options...)
}
type parseCtx struct {
decryptParams DecryptParameters
verifyParams VerifyParameters
keySet jwk.Set
keySetProvider KeySetProvider
token Token
validateOpts []ValidateOption
verifyAutoOpts []jws.VerifyOption
localReg *json.Registry
inferAlgorithm bool
pedantic bool
skipVerification bool
useDefault bool
validate bool
verifyAuto bool
}
func parseBytes(data []byte, options ...ParseOption) (Token, error) {
var ctx parseCtx
for _, o := range options {
if v, ok := o.(ValidateOption); ok {
ctx.validateOpts = append(ctx.validateOpts, v)
continue
}
//nolint:forcetypeassert
switch o.Ident() {
case identVerifyAuto{}:
ctx.verifyAuto = o.Value().(bool)
case identFetchWhitelist{}:
ctx.verifyAutoOpts = append(ctx.verifyAutoOpts, jws.WithFetchWhitelist(o.Value().(jwk.Whitelist)))
case identHTTPClient{}:
ctx.verifyAutoOpts = append(ctx.verifyAutoOpts, jws.WithHTTPClient(o.Value().(*http.Client)))
case identFetchBackoff{}:
ctx.verifyAutoOpts = append(ctx.verifyAutoOpts, jws.WithFetchBackoff(o.Value().(backoff.Policy)))
case identJWKSetFetcher{}:
ctx.verifyAutoOpts = append(ctx.verifyAutoOpts, jws.WithJWKSetFetcher(o.Value().(jws.JWKSetFetcher)))
case identVerify{}:
ctx.verifyParams = o.Value().(VerifyParameters)
case identDecrypt{}:
ctx.decryptParams = o.Value().(DecryptParameters)
case identKeySet{}:
ks, ok := o.Value().(jwk.Set)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.Errorf(`invalid JWK set passed via WithKeySet() option (%T)`, o.Value())
}
ctx.keySet = ks
case identToken{}:
token, ok := o.Value().(Token)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.Errorf(`invalid token passed via WithToken() option (%T)`, o.Value())
}
ctx.token = token
case identPedantic{}:
ctx.pedantic = o.Value().(bool)
case identDefault{}:
ctx.useDefault = o.Value().(bool)
case identValidate{}:
ctx.validate = o.Value().(bool)
case identTypedClaim{}:
pair := o.Value().(claimPair)
if ctx.localReg == nil {
ctx.localReg = json.NewRegistry()
}
ctx.localReg.Register(pair.Name, pair.Value)
case identInferAlgorithmFromKey{}:
ctx.inferAlgorithm = o.Value().(bool)
case identKeySetProvider{}:
ctx.keySetProvider = o.Value().(KeySetProvider)
}
}
data = bytes.TrimSpace(data)
return parse(&ctx, data)
}
const (
_JwsVerifyInvalid = iota
_JwsVerifyDone
_JwsVerifyExpectNested
_JwsVerifySkipped
)
func verifyJWS(ctx *parseCtx, payload []byte) ([]byte, int, error) {
if ctx.verifyAuto {
options := ctx.verifyAutoOpts
verified, err := jws.VerifyAuto(payload, options...)
return verified, _JwsVerifyDone, err
}
// if we have a key set or a provider, use that
ks := ctx.keySet
p := ctx.keySetProvider
if ks != nil || p != nil {
return verifyJWSWithKeySet(ctx, payload)
}
// We can't proceed without verification parameters
vp := ctx.verifyParams
if vp == nil {
return nil, _JwsVerifySkipped, nil
}
return verifyJWSWithParams(ctx, payload, vp.Algorithm(), vp.Key())
}
func verifyJWSWithKeySet(ctx *parseCtx, payload []byte) ([]byte, int, error) {
// First, get the JWS message
msg, err := jws.Parse(payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.Wrap(err, `failed to parse token data as JWS message`)
}
ks := ctx.keySet
if ks == nil { // the caller should have checked ctx.keySet || ctx.keySetProvider
if p := ctx.keySetProvider; p != nil {
// "trust" the payload, and parse it so that the provider can do its thing
ctx.skipVerification = true
tok, err := parse(ctx, msg.Payload())
if err != nil {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, err
}
ctx.skipVerification = false
v, err := p.KeySetFrom(tok)
if err != nil {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.Wrap(err, `failed to obtain jwk.Set from KeySetProvider`)
}
ks = v
}
}
// Bail out early if we don't even have a key in the set
if ks.Len() == 0 {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.New(`empty keyset provided`)
}
var key jwk.Key
// Find the kid. we need the kid, unless the user explicitly
// specified to use the "default" (the first and only) key in the set
headers := msg.Signatures()[0].ProtectedHeaders()
kid := headers.KeyID()
if kid == "" {
// If the kid is NOT specified... ctx.useDefault needs to be true, and the
// JWKs must have exactly one key in it
if !ctx.useDefault {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.New(`failed to find matching key: no key ID ("kid") specified in token`)
} else if ctx.useDefault && ks.Len() > 1 {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.New(`failed to find matching key: no key ID ("kid") specified in token but multiple keys available in key set`)
}
// if we got here, then useDefault == true AND there is exactly
// one key in the set.
key, _ = ks.Get(0)
} else {
// Otherwise we better be able to look up the key, baby.
v, ok := ks.LookupKeyID(kid)
if !ok {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.Errorf(`failed to find key with key ID %q in key set`, kid)
}
key = v
}
// We found a key with matching kid. Check fo the algorithm specified in the key.
// If we find an algorithm in the key, use that.
if v := key.Algorithm(); v != "" {
var alg jwa.SignatureAlgorithm
if err := alg.Accept(v); err != nil {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.Wrapf(err, `invalid signature algorithm %s`, key.Algorithm())
}
// Okay, we have a valid algorithm, go go
return verifyJWSWithParams(ctx, payload, alg, key)
}
if ctx.inferAlgorithm {
// Check whether the JWT headers specify a valid
// algorithm, use it if it's compatible.
algs, err := jws.AlgorithmsForKey(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.Wrapf(err, `failed to get a list of signature methods for key type %s`, key.KeyType())
}
for _, alg := range algs {
// bail out if the JWT has a `alg` field, and it doesn't match
if tokAlg := headers.Algorithm(); tokAlg != "" {
if tokAlg != alg {
continue
}
}
return verifyJWSWithParams(ctx, payload, alg, key)
}
}
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.New(`failed to match any of the keys`)
}
func verifyJWSWithParams(ctx *parseCtx, payload []byte, alg jwa.SignatureAlgorithm, key interface{}) ([]byte, int, error) {
var m *jws.Message
var verifyOpts []jws.VerifyOption
if ctx.pedantic {
m = jws.NewMessage()
verifyOpts = []jws.VerifyOption{jws.WithMessage(m)}
}
v, err := jws.Verify(payload, alg, key, verifyOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.Wrap(err, `failed to verify jws signature`)
}
if !ctx.pedantic {
return v, _JwsVerifyDone, nil
}
// This payload could be a JWT+JWS, in which case typ: JWT should be there
// If its JWT+(JWE or JWS or...)+JWS, then cty should be JWT
for _, sig := range m.Signatures() {
hdrs := sig.ProtectedHeaders()
if strings.ToLower(hdrs.Type()) == _jwt {
return v, _JwsVerifyDone, nil
}
if strings.ToLower(hdrs.ContentType()) == _jwt {
return v, _JwsVerifyExpectNested, nil
}
}
// Hmmm, it was a JWS and we got... nothing?
return nil, _JwsVerifyInvalid, errors.Errorf(`expected "typ" or "cty" fields, neither could be found`)
}
// verify parameter exists to make sure that we don't accidentally skip
// over verification just because alg == "" or key == nil or something.
func parse(ctx *parseCtx, data []byte) (Token, error) {
payload := data
const maxDecodeLevels = 2
// If cty = `JWT`, we expect this to be a nested structure
var expectNested bool
OUTER:
for i := 0; i < maxDecodeLevels; i++ {
switch kind := jwx.GuessFormat(payload); kind {
case jwx.JWT:
if ctx.pedantic {
if expectNested {
return nil, errors.Errorf(`expected nested encrypted/signed payload, got raw JWT`)
}
}
if i == 0 {
// We were NOT enveloped in other formats
if !ctx.skipVerification {
if _, _, err := verifyJWS(ctx, payload); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
break OUTER
case jwx.UnknownFormat:
// "Unknown" may include invalid JWTs, for example, those who lack "aud"
// claim. We could be pedantic and reject these
if ctx.pedantic {
return nil, errors.Errorf(`invalid JWT`)
}
if i == 0 {
// We were NOT enveloped in other formats
if !ctx.skipVerification {
if _, _, err := verifyJWS(ctx, payload); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
break OUTER
case jwx.JWS:
// Food for thought: This is going to break if you have multiple layers of
// JWS enveloping using different keys. It is highly unlikely use case,
// but it might happen.
// skipVerification should only be set to true by us. It's used
// when we just want to parse the JWT out of a payload
if !ctx.skipVerification {
// nested return value means:
// false (next envelope _may_ need to be processed)
// true (next envelope MUST be processed)
v, state, err := verifyJWS(ctx, payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if state != _JwsVerifySkipped {
payload = v
// We only check for cty and typ if the pedantic flag is enabled
if !ctx.pedantic {
continue
}
if state == _JwsVerifyExpectNested {
expectNested = true
continue OUTER
}
// if we're not nested, we found our target. bail out of this loop
break OUTER
}
}
// No verification.
m, err := jws.Parse(data)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, `invalid jws message`)
}
payload = m.Payload()
case jwx.JWE:
dp := ctx.decryptParams
if dp == nil {
return nil, errors.Errorf(`jwt.Parse: cannot proceed with JWE encrypted payload without decryption parameters`)
}
var m *jwe.Message
var decryptOpts []jwe.DecryptOption
if ctx.pedantic {
m = jwe.NewMessage()
decryptOpts = []jwe.DecryptOption{jwe.WithMessage(m)}
}
v, err := jwe.Decrypt(data, dp.Algorithm(), dp.Key(), decryptOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, `failed to decrypt payload`)
}
if !ctx.pedantic {
payload = v
continue
}
if strings.ToLower(m.ProtectedHeaders().Type()) == _jwt {
payload = v
break OUTER
}
if strings.ToLower(m.ProtectedHeaders().ContentType()) == _jwt {
expectNested = true
payload = v
continue OUTER
}
default:
return nil, errors.Errorf(`unsupported format (layer: #%d)`, i+1)
}
expectNested = false
}
if ctx.token == nil {
ctx.token = New()
}
if ctx.localReg != nil {
dcToken, ok := ctx.token.(TokenWithDecodeCtx)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.Errorf(`typed claim was requested, but the token (%T) does not support DecodeCtx`, ctx.token)
}
dc := json.NewDecodeCtx(ctx.localReg)
dcToken.SetDecodeCtx(dc)
defer func() { dcToken.SetDecodeCtx(nil) }()
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, ctx.token); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, `failed to parse token`)
}
if ctx.validate {
if err := Validate(ctx.token, ctx.validateOpts...); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return ctx.token, nil
}
// Sign is a convenience function to create a signed JWT token serialized in
// compact form.
//
// It accepts either a raw key (e.g. rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey, etc)
// or a jwk.Key, and the name of the algorithm that should be used to sign
// the token.
//
// If the key is a jwk.Key and the key contains a key ID (`kid` field),
// then it is added to the protected header generated by the signature
//
// The algorithm specified in the `alg` parameter must be able to support
// the type of key you provided, otherwise an error is returned.
//
// The protected header will also automatically have the `typ` field set
// to the literal value `JWT`, unless you provide a custom value for it
// by jwt.WithHeaders option.
func Sign(t Token, alg jwa.SignatureAlgorithm, key interface{}, options ...SignOption) ([]byte, error) {
return NewSerializer().Sign(alg, key, options...).Serialize(t)
}
// Equal compares two JWT tokens. Do not use `reflect.Equal` or the like
// to compare tokens as they will also compare extra detail such as
// sync.Mutex objects used to control concurrent access.
//
// The comparison for values is currently done using a simple equality ("=="),
// except for time.Time, which uses time.Equal after dropping the monotonic
// clock and truncating the values to 1 second accuracy.
//
// if both t1 and t2 are nil, returns true
func Equal(t1, t2 Token) bool {
if t1 == nil && t2 == nil {
return true
}
// we already checked for t1 == t2 == nil, so safe to do this
if t1 == nil || t2 == nil {
return false
}
j1, err := json.Marshal(t1)
if err != nil {
return false
}
j2, err := json.Marshal(t2)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return bytes.Equal(j1, j2)
}
func (t *stdToken) Clone() (Token, error) {
dst := New()
for _, pair := range t.makePairs() {
//nolint:forcetypeassert
key := pair.Key.(string)
if err := dst.Set(key, pair.Value); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, `failed to set %s`, key)
}
}
return dst, nil
}
// RegisterCustomField allows users to specify that a private field
// be decoded as an instance of the specified type. This option has
// a global effect.
//
// For example, suppose you have a custom field `x-birthday`, which
// you want to represent as a string formatted in RFC3339 in JSON,
// but want it back as `time.Time`.
//
// In that case you would register a custom field as follows
//
// jwt.RegisterCustomField(`x-birthday`, timeT)
//
// Then `token.Get("x-birthday")` will still return an `interface{}`,
// but you can convert its type to `time.Time`
//
// bdayif, _ := token.Get(`x-birthday`)
// bday := bdayif.(time.Time)
//
func RegisterCustomField(name string, object interface{}) {
registry.Register(name, object)
}